A Critical Introduction to Liberalismby
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About the Author - Paul McLaughlin teaches in the Philosophy Institute, Pedagogical Academy of Zielona Gora, Poland. Download the Current Edition in PDF Format! Search The Examined Life
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Click here for Printer Friendly Format Page [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 2. Critical?In what sense, then, is this essay critical? In two senses: critical, from the philosophical standpoint, of liberal theory (theory which, fundamentally, gets something of an easy ride); and critical, from the socio-political standpoint, of the consonance between this theory and liberal society. In the latter case, the criticism consists in merely suggesting some degree of consonance. Little more is possible. Such consonance is often denied, notably by left-liberals and ‘progressives’. They assert, by contrast, dissonance between a theory - which if not consummate is at least benign[4] - and an unjust, would-be ‘liberal’ society. Some, of course, deny that liberal society is unjust - a claim that is sociologically troublesome, to say the least. Consider some figures for the United States, seemingly the greatest champion of liberal values, for example:
As with all statistics, there is room for interpretation here. Doubtless I have been highly selective too. However, none of these numbers suggest that the United States is, as a liberal society (as those in question maintain that it is), just – unless, by common sense standards, one has a fairly perverse notion of justice which accepts dramatic and increasing inequality as a fact of life in a ‘free’ society - and the principle of inequality (or, sophistically, the ‘difference principle’), most perversely in common sense terms but most conventionally in academic philosophical terms, as universally beneficial and even as a component of justice. Liberal society, may, of course, be more just than the other prescribed social form(s)[8], but justice, I contend, is not settled upon by means of the lesser-of-two-evils (or even the least-of-three-or-four-evils) logic. I tend to agree in principle with Murray Bookchin when he writes: As is the case with liberalism, some Marxists (and a few non-Marxists) deny any consonance between Marxian theory and communist praxis. Thus many say something along the lines of ‘The Soviet Union wasn’t a real communist society’. The notion of dissonance here was challenged forcefully at the very outset by Mikhail Bakunin. Bakunin emphasized what he felt would be the inevitable consequences of any practical attempt to realize Marxian ideas. Most contemporary analysts conclude that Bakunin ‘perspicaciously predicted’ certain features of such praxis.[10] Bakunin drew two main lines of consonance. The first and best known is that between, theoretically, Marx’s authoritarian disposition of thought (what Bakunin saw as his ‘worship of State power’[11]) and, practically, communist authoritarianism (‘the most aristocratic, despotic, arrogant, and contemptuous of all regimes’ that would, according to Bakunin, ensue, a regime in which there would ‘be a new class, a new hierarchy of real and fictitious savants’, so that ‘the world [would be] be divided into a minority dominating in the name of science [or ‘scientific socialism’] and a vast, ignorant majority’ which would be brutally oppressed by the former[12]). The second line of consonance is that between, theoretically, Marx’s anthropocentric bias (his belief that ‘Nature [is] simply an object for mankind’[13]) and, practically, communist ecological destruction. This line is less clear since, as Brian Morris puts it, ‘Bakunin’s philosophical writings on Nature present in embryonic form [only] an ecological approach to the world’.[14] Nevertheless, Bakunin’s constant reaffirmation of the idea that nature precedes man and critique of Marx’s anthropocentric or ‘metaphysical’ belief that man precedes nature paves the way for ecological critique of Marxian thought and communist praxis. Many liberals have acknowledged the consonance between Marxian theory and communist praxis; some have exaggerated it, presumably for ideological gain. Still, even those liberals who are uneasy about the condition of ostensibly liberal society remain loyal to their philosophical tradition. Thus, they assert something along the lines of ‘The U.S. isn’t a real liberal society’. By contrast, I believe that the possibility of consonance between liberal theory and praxis ought at least to be raised. I wish to mention three flaws in liberal society. That they are flaws at all might be debated, but we will leave that debate aside. It should further be noted that they are not philosophically demonstrable; they are, however, open to sociological analysis and, I believe, demonstrable as such. The flaws might be expressed as follows:
Is there any consonance, then, between these flaws and liberal theory? To go some way toward answering this, we must look at this theory. I will begin by asking exactly what theory it is that we are talking about, as well as who we might regard as the proponents of this theory.
[4]
All the flaws that critics of liberalism might reveal are, on the ‘benign’
account, simple and innocent oversights – never symptomatic of basic
theoretical deficiency (whatever its causes – intellectual, ideological,
or whatever - may be). Thus ‘neither Foucault, Derrida, Nietzsche nor
Lacan [by no means the most challenging critics of liberalism, it might
be said] can make obsolete the old-fashioned utopian scenario, the one
that leads [in fact?] to a global society of freedom and equal opportunity.
All they can do is supplement it. They cannot reveal the philosophical
weaknesses of the bourgeois liberalism common to Mill and Dewey; they
can only reveal its blind spots, its failure to perceive forms of suffering
which it should have perceived. There were [past tense?] many such blind
spots, but they were not a result of some wholesale failure to understand
the nature of the subject, or of desire, or of language, or of society,
or of history, or of anything else of similar magnitude. They were the
sorts of blind spots which we all have – correctable not by increasing
philosophical sophistication, but simply by having our attention called
to the harm we have been doing without noticing that we are doing
it’ [Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1999), pp. 236-37; emphasis added]. Hence liberals are
immune from fundamental criticism. Sure, they make mistakes, but they’re
basically good guys. If their ideas should appear to vindicate imperialism
or despotism (even Mill’s could be said to [see On Liberty (London:
Everyman, 1984), pp. 78-79, where he says that liberty isn’t for ‘backward
states of society’ and that ‘Despotism is a legitimate mode of government
in dealing with barbarians’) or anything quite so unpleasant, it’s unfortunate
but forgivable. If only liberals were so charitable in their interpretation
of, say, socialist theorists. (It ought to be acknowledged on my part
that certain of my misgivings about Mill, who is indeed one of the more
credible and insightful liberals, may have arisen because of my nationality.
From an Irish perspective, Mill’s sense of freedom, equality, and justice
seems somewhat partial and his attitude seems imperialistic. He wrote
the following in 1864 (within a generation of the Great Famine in Ireland):
‘[Previous ‘disgraceful’ treatment granted,] No Irishman is now less
free than an Anglo-Saxon, nor has a less share of every benefit either
to his country or his individual fortunes than if he were sprung from
any other portion of the British dominions… The consciousness of being
at last treated not only with equal justice but with equal consideration
is making such rapid way in the Irish nation as to be wearing off all
feelings that could make them insensible to the benefits which the less
numerous and less wealthy people must necessarily derive from being
fellow-citizens instead of foreigners to those who are not only their
nearest neighbours, but the wealthiest, and one of the freest, as well
as the most civilised and powerful, nations of the earth’ [Considerations
on Representative Government (London: Everyman, 1984), p. 397].
[5]
Above data from the YMCA's Nation's Report Card 1999.
[6]
Data from The Sentencing Project's Americans Behind Bars: US and
International Use of Incarceration, 1995 (1997).
[7] Above data from US Bureau of Justice Statistics. [8]It may, in the US’s case, even have a relatively good media, legal, and educational system – despite rather obvious criticisms of all these, e.g., its media are, by and large, corporate-controlled, many senior people within its legal system are political appointees and electable figures tend to pander to populist sentiment, and its third level educational institutions have hugely unequal resources, a factor favouring the private sector and those who can afford it. Nevertheless, as Rorty puts it with pride, ‘We have freedom of the press, an independent judiciary, and universities in which [if only it were true!] teachers continually urge students to combat (in [Richard] Bernstein’s words) “the forces and tendencies at work (e.g., class conflict, social division, patriarchy, racism) which are compatible with liberal political practices but nevertheless foster real inequality and limit effective political freedom”’ [‘Thugs and Theorists’, op. cit., p. 567].
[9]
The Modern Crisis, p. 6. As an instance of the lesser-of-two-evils
logic, note the following from Rorty: ‘I think that our country – despite
its past and present atrocities and vices, and despite its continuing
eagerness to elect fools and knaves to high office [never truer!] –
is a good example of the best kind of society so far invented’
[Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 4; emphasis added]. - It may
be atrocious, but it’s better than the supposed alternative(s). This
is a pretty big claim which would require extensive historical, anthropological,
and even philosophical investigation to justify. But that kind of justification
doesn’t appeal to Rorty. We might be willing to concede, after being
presented with some historical evidence, that Rorty’s country represents
the best kind of State (as opposed to society) so far invented (that
question is not uninteresting and certainly hasn’t been definitively
answered); but that still leaves the fundamental question of the legitimacy
(even in pragmatic terms) of the state unexplored – as indeed it is
in Rorty’s writings. In any case, we will take up these issues below.
[10]The
phrase is Richard Adamiak’s in his ‘The Withering Away of the State:
A Reconsideration’, Journal of Politics, XXXII (1970), p. 6,
note 8.
[11]
See Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings, ed. Arthur Lehning (London:
Jonathan Cape, 1973), p. 238.
[12]
Archives Bakounine, II, ed. Arthur Lehning (Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1965), p. 204.
[13] Marx’s Grundrisse, Second Edition, ed. David McLellan (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), p. 99; emphasis added.
[15]
Bookchin writes passionately and convincingly about the processes involved
here [The Murray Bookchin Reader, ed. Janet Biehl (Washington:
Casseell, 1997), pp. 95-96], about ‘the disintegration of the community
into a marketplace’ and of the ‘ethical union between people into ethical
rivalry and aggressive egotism’. He notes that all this results in a
‘massive dissolution of personal and social ties’. He adds: ‘With the
hollowing out of community by the market system, with its loss of structure,
articulation, and form, comes the concomitant hollowing out of personality
itself. Just as the spiritual and institutional ties that linked human
beings together into vibrant social relations are eroded by the mass
market, so the sinews that make for subjectivity, character, and self-definition
are divested of form and meaning. The isolated, seemingly autonomous
ego that bourgeois society celebrated as the highest achievement of
“modernity” turns out to be the mere husk of a once fairly rounded individual
whose very completeness as an ego was [due to the fact that] he or she
was rooted in a fairly rounded and complete community’. Thus we move
on to the second flaw, below.
[16]
Bookchin hints at something similar to what we have in mind: ‘far from
being free, the ego in its sovereign selfhood is bound hand and foot
to the seemingly anonymous laws of the marketplace... which render the
myth of individual freedom into another fetish concealing the implacable
laws of capital accumulation’ [Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism:
An Unbridgeable Chasm (Edinburgh: AK Press, 1995), p. 52].
[17]
Noam Chomsky writes: ‘Democracy is under attack worldwide, including
the leading industrial countries; at least, democracy in a meaningful
sense of the term, involving opportunities for people to manage their
own collective and individual affairs. Something similar is true of
markets. The assaults on democracy and markets are furthermore related.
Their roots lie in the power of corporate entities that are totalitarian
in internal structure, increasingly interlinked and reliant on powerful
states, and largely unaccountable to the public’ [in ‘Market Democracy
in a Neoliberal Order: Doctrines and Reality’, online at http://www.zmag.org/chomsky/index.cfm].
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