About the Author - Paul McLaughlin teaches in the Philosophy Institute, Pedagogical Academy of Zielona Gora, Poland.

Discuss this Article

Submit a Rebuttal

Recommend this site

 

Search The Web

Philosophy Humanities History Classics Science Math

Social Sciences Literature Art Education Linguistics Religion

Free! Examined Life Philosophy Resource Browser

Free! Philosophy Quotations Program

Worldwide Philosophy Events Database

Philosophy Resource Search Engine

 

Click here for Printer Friendly Format

Page [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

PART THREE: PROVISIONAL CONCLUSIONS

1. Summary and Objections

In the previous section, I attempted to analyze liberalism’s three central concepts. Given the confines of space, the conclusions reached must be considered tentative and provisional, that is, open to further analysis and revision. Briefly, in any event, it was concluded about liberalism that: (1) its concept of the individual is generally partial and, as the centerpiece of an economistic anthropocentrism, alien to naturalistic thought; (2) its concept of liberty, in its abstraction from the egalitarian principle and an overall integral vision of justice, is also partial and therefore at odds with the content of the genuinely progressive tradition; and (3) its concept of authority is either baseless or philosophically shallow.

Doubtless some of these criticisms will be considered stronger than others; doubtless, too, I have overlooked some obvious weaknesses in my argument. Generally, though, I feel that the critique is heading in the right direction. The discussion of the first concept will, presumably, raise most doubts. It can broadly be said of the second element of the critique, perhaps, that it has a certain intuitive and historical relevance and viability. And the third element – pertaining to the anarchist position, whatever its practical consequences – is, as I believe many are willing to grant, philosophically strong. however, perhaps the first element assumes that ontological naturalism is superior to post-Kantian anthropocentrism. What right is there to make this assumption? In the first place, it is not entirely an assumption; it was argued that the only alternative to naturalism is to posit some qualitatively distinct category that amounts to the ‘supernatural’ (whether we call it culture, language, theory, or whatever). It is not clear how the mysterious dualism implied or the role of mediation that the ‘supernatural’ component supposedly performs can be demonstrated. This entire way of thinking strikes me as being profoundly metaphysical and, if I am guilty of any assumption, it is that naturalistic thought is superior to metaphysics, since, if nothing else, it seems reasonably competent at demonstrating some things and not entirely dependent on arbitrary dualistic categorization (such as the dualism of nature and culture). All of this requires extensive elaboration, of course, but this is not the place for it. Suffice it to say that only an intellectual culture enraptured by metaphysics and long since divorced from the Enlightenment tradition would think naturalistic criticism outrageous.

Another objection to our analysis will probably be that it is ‘one-sided’. Sure, liberalism isn’t perfect, but which political philosophy is? It’s actually the best we’ve got, so why represent it as all bad? In the first place, the ‘other’, ‘positive’ side is largely taken as given in a culture that almost takes the ‘truth’ of liberalism for granted. So, it might Ill be a superfluous exercise to investigate it. Additionally, there is no suggestion that I deny the ‘other’ side; indeed, I acknowledged it in the case of liberal individualism and are Ill aware of the historical contribution of liberalism to the promotion of freedom and the challenge to authority. In general, I claimed on all these matters that liberalism is partial, not false; that is to say, I recognize its achievements but maintain that it hasn’t gone far enough. If it is ‘one-sided’ or partial to point to partiality, however, I confess that I am guilty as charged.

An alternative response: Our analysis did focus on liberalism’s deficiencies rather than its strengths; but that, by and large, is the nature of critical analysis. A full introduction to liberalism would indeed require a much more adequate treatment of liberalism’s strengths relative to other ideologies, and, only subsequent to that, a fair evaluation. However, for practical reasons (of length) apart from anything else, I chose to focus more narrowly on the weaknesses of the liberal position. So, yes, in this sense the analysis is ‘one-sided’ – but that is implicit in the title: this is not an introduction, but a critical introduction. In any event, I do not pretend that our evaluation is definitive, so the criticism doesn’t really apply.

Yet another objection could be that I have presented liberalism as a uniform theory and therefore glossed over some of its variations and subtleties. Worse still, in doing so, I appear to rank, say, the philosophical brilliance of Locke alongside the ideological vitriol of von Mises. Absolutely, von Mises is, philosophically, unfit to be mentioned in the same breath as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Mill, etc. Furthermore, the neo-liberalism of von Mises, Hayek, and others is far from identical with classical liberalism. However, neo-liberalism does constitute a fundamentalist interpretation of certain liberal themes; while it stresses them to the point of absurdity, it does at least draw our attention to them. Additionally, this particularly ideological version of liberal political philosophy has been extremely influential and is therefore worth considering, particularly in relation to the issue of consonance which I will take up shortly. As far as the uniformity of our account is concerned, this is to be expected up to a point, especially in an introduction of this length. In general, I Ire looking to explore common themes in order to reach a definition of liberalism as such. Still, I did point out a few of the more pertinent differences between, for example, ethical and economistic individualism, negative and positive concepts of liberty, ‘egalitarian’ and ‘non-egalitarian’ liberalism, social contract and non-social contract liberalism, and genetic social contract and ethico-political social contract liberalism. This is, I feel, as much as could reasonably be expected.

2. Consonance.

Having taken a critical look at liberal theory – having undertaken the philosophical aspect of our critical introduction - I return, finally, to the second aspect of criticism – the socio-political criticism of the alleged consonance between this theory (with the theoretical deficiencies I have asserted) and liberal society (with those practical deficiencies I asserted at the beginning). In the philosophical context, this kind of analysis is necessarily speculative. Sociological analysis could, I believe, supplement the philosophical case, but such analysis is beyond our scope.

The first sociopolitical deficiency asserted was the dissolution of social bonds, at all levels, from the community to friendship, that results from excessive personalism and actually perverts individuality. That there could be some relation between this flaw and a theoretical over-statement of, in particular, an economistically (that is, I affirm, partially) conceived individual is not impossible.

The second such deficiency asserted was the exaggerated attachment to the notion of consumer freedom that appears to have replaced a more traditional, humanistic understanding of the concept. That this transformation mirrors the abstraction of freedom from an integral understanding of justice by an economistically-oriented philosophy deserves some reflection.

Finally, the third deficiency was the general unaccountability of the authorities, political and economic, that dominate contemporary society. The relation between this lack of practical accountability and the lack of theoretical reason, not to say the reversion to ideological mystification, evident in the philosophy of authority may or may not be of philosophical interest.

A number of objections to the above come to mind. The first is that it is too vague to be informative. The lines of consonance sketched here are indeed vague; however this is quite intentional. The purpose of this discussion of consonance is merely to suggest some kind of relation between liberal theory and liberal praxis. To explain the nature of this relation, if possible, would require lengthy and demanding inquiry which is Ill beyond the parameters of this introduction. A second objection is almost the inverse of the first. It is the accusation of idealism: the belief that ideas govern the world. However, no claim is made that liberal theory has determined the shape of liberal society. Again, I reserve judgment on the precise nature of the relation between the ideas and the social flaws I have referred to. The intention is merely to indicate some relation. A third objection is, whatever the nature of the relation, I am guilty of exaggeration in claiming any kind of consonance; in other words, I lack sufficient evidence to posit any meaningful relation. This may be true. But, again, I seek only to suggest a relation; I do assert its meaningfulness. Fourth, and final, I might be accused of artificially and pre-meditatively formulating both theory and praxis to intimate a close relation or high level of consonance between them. Of course, the outline is deliberate or pre-meditated, but that does not make it ‘false’ or even unreliable. Such an approach is surely a philosophical prerogative. Regardless, artificial or otherwise, my claims for any consonance there may be are, if I may say so, judicious.

This measured note may be a suitable point at which to sign off, since it is likely that some of the more controversial criticisms made here of a political philosophy which has been, for the most part, less than adequately challenged to date will provide sufficient material for future debate. Such debate is to be welcomed.

Page [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Click here for Printer Friendly Format